The lack of international diversification in equity portfolios is one the most persistent observations in international finance. Investors hold a large share of their wealth in domestic securities, more than what would be dictated by the share of these securities in the world market. This is known as the "the home-bias puzzle" (French and Poterba, 1991, Tesar and Werner, 1995). This paper proposes an explanation of the home-bias puzzle based on ambiguity aversion. When investors are uncertain about the true data-generating model and fear misspecification, model uncertainty becomes an additional hedging reason underlying optimal portfolio choices. We show that this additional motif translates into hedging long-run real exchange rate risk and can help to explain a large share of the U.S. home bias in equity. We develop a simple dynamic general equilibrium two-country model of consumption and portfolio choices under incomplete financial markets, where asset trading includes equities and bonds in two currencies. In particular, we derive the optimal portfolio allocation in terms of covariances between excess returns and the implied sources of risk. Along this dimension, we contrast the theoretical and empirical implications of ambiguity aversion with those of rational expectations. Under rational expectations and log utility, the model implies that the cross-country variation in non-tradeable labor income is the only risk that investors should hedge in international financial markets. This channel has been emphasized, among others, by Baxter and Jermann (1997), Bottazzi et al. (1998), Heathcote and Perri (2004) and Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009). However, our empirical evaluation based on international data shows that labor-income risk alone is not able to explain the home-bias puzzle. Indeed, the empirical covariance between the model-implied laborincome risk and the excess return on foreign versus domestic equity is quantitatively very small, thereby implying quasi-full portfolio diversification. By relaxing the assumption of log utility, the model would imply an additional source of risk related to the inflation differential across countries which translates into fluctuations in the real exchange rate (as in Adler and Dumas, 1983, Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994, van Wincoop and Warnock, 2006, 2008 and Coeurdacier and Gourinchas, 2009. However this channel is also weak empirically, as discussed among others by van Wincoop and Warnock (2006, 2008), because the covariance between the real exchange rate and the excess return on foreign versus domestic equity is small, once conditioned on the excess return on bonds. Hedging real exchange rate risk could become more important to explain the international home-bias puzzle by raising the risk-aversion coefficient. However, in this case, the model would imply a counterfactually high risk-free rate, a problem known as the risk-free rate puzzle (Weil, 1989). The main result of this paper is to show that model misspecification implies hedging against fluctuations in the real exchange rate even if the elasticity of substitution is unitary. Therefore, this hedging motif can become empirically important without falling in the risk-free rate puzzle. There are, however, two important differences with respect to the existing literature. First, the real exchange rate risk emphasized by our model is not directly related to relative inflation risk but rather to the extent to which investors are averse to model uncertainty. This explains why this source of risk can arise also in the case of log utility. Second, the relevant horizon at which agents would like to evaluate real exchange rate risk is more the long run rather than the short run usually emphasized by the literature. In our model economy, investors are endowed with a reference probability distribution, but they mistrust that such distribution is in fact the actual data-generating one. They suspect instead that the true one lies within a set of nearby distributions that are statistically difficult to distinguish in finite samples. Investors are averse to this ambiguity, and therefore seek decision rules that are robust to it. In particular, we use the sophisticated agents of the robust-control literature, developed by Hansen and Sargent (2005). These agents make their decisions considering the worst possible
probability distribution, within the set of alternative ones that they consider. In this sense, the size of the set of alternative models captures the degree of aversion to model uncertainty: the larger the set, the more unfavorable the worst-case scenario. The intuition for why we recover an additional hedging component related to real exchange rate risk works as follows. Agents fearing model misspecification make decisions considering the worst-case scenario. We show that such worst-case scenario takes the form of downward revisions in the expected cross-country consumption profile, over the entire planning horizon, and that these revisions are related to news on current and future appreciations of the real exchange rate. Ambiguity-averse investors want to hedge against this scenario and, therefore, overinvest in securities that pay relatively better when there are news on current or future appreciations. This additional hedging motif is the more relevant the more averse to model uncertainty the agents are. Our empirical analysis shows that this channel is quantitatively more important than the hedging component related to non-tradeable income risk. Moreover, the hedging motif due to model uncertainty is able to explain a large share of the equity home bias. This result holds for reasonable degrees of ambiguity aversion, which we calibrate using detection error probabilities, i.e. imposing that alternative models must be difficult to tell apart in finite samples (Hansen and Sargent, 2005) . The result that real exchange rate risk is relevant to explain the home-bias puzzle may seem surprising given recent findings of van Wincoop and Warnock (2006, 2008) and Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009) , who show that the real exchange rate does not co-vary much with the excess return on equities, once conditioning on bond returns. However, their result is specific to one-period ahead changes in the real exchange rate. On the contrary, in our dynamic model, long-run fluctuations in the real exchange rate are more relevant for investors. In this respect, we find that equities allow to hedge much better against this long-run risk and this is why we are able to explain the home-bias puzzle. Finally, we show that ambiguity aversion is also able to reconcile the model with other stylized empirical facts on U.S. cross-border holdings that the rational-expectations benchmark has difficulties in replicating. In particular, the U.S. is a net creditor in equity instruments and a net debtor in bond instruments, its position in foreign-currency bonds is about balanced, whereas that in home-currency bonds is largely negative (Tille, 2005 and 2008) . While we work in discrete time, our paper is closely related to some recent continuous-time studies on international portfolio choices under ambiguity and information incompleteness. Uppal and Wang (2003) and Epstein and Miao (2005) use ambiguity aversion based on recursive multiple priors. Importantly, however, both contributions derive the result of under-diversification in international financial markets upon assuming that agents have more ambiguity in the foreign asset's return.
1 Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2007) model an economy with imperfect information in which agents can learn and acquire better information on domestic and foreign stocks. However, to get home bias they need to assume that each home investor has more precise prior information about home asset's payoff than foreigners have. Unlike the contributions above, this paper derives a departure from full portfolio diversification that can go in either directions, and is not based upon an a priori asymmetry (that home agents have more ambiguity or less information with respect to foreign assets returns). Indeed, our world economy is completely symmetric ex-ante, and whether or not our results are consistent with the observed home bias in equity portfolios depends on the sign of the covariances in the data. More broadly, this paper is also related to the very large literature addressing the puzzle of 1 From a methodological perspective, our paper is also related to Maenhout (2004 Maenhout ( , 2006 , who however does not deal with the home-bias puzzle. He develops a modification of the continuous-time robust-control literature to study portfolio and consumption choices in a closed-economy partial-equilibrium dynamic model. To get a closed-form solution he adopts a transformation of the objective function of the decision makers that changes the penalization of entropy from a constant Lagrange multiplier into a function of the value function. This modification deeply changes the nature of the approach proposed by Hansen and Sargent (2005) in a way that it is not comparable with the one proposed here. See the discussion in Pathak (2002). international under-diversification. Much effort has been made to develop general equilibrium models of portfolio choice, but no clear consensus has yet been reached. The proposed explanations range from the existence of information frictions to trade costs in goods and asset markets, home bias in consumption, sticky prices, terms of trade movements.
2
Our paper departs from the existing literature mainly along three dimensions. First of all, most of the existing models derive the portfolio shares as a function of primitive parameters, like the riskaversion coefficient, the share of traded goods, or the trade cost. This is clearly a desirable feature of general equilibrium models, but it has the drawback of hiding the hedging relationships based on observable variables that are at the root of the portfolio decisions. In fact, as shown by van Wincoop and Warnock (2006, 2008) , the covariances between the asset returns and the sources of risk implied by these models are often counterfactual: once data restrictions on asset prices are considered, these models fail to solve the portfolio home-bias puzzle. On the other hand, the few contributions focusing on the hedging relationships that underlie portfolio choices (such as Coeurdacier and Gourinchas, 2009 and van Wincoop and Warnock, 2006 , 2008 typically use static models, which, by construction, neglect any possible source of long-run risk. On the contrary, we focus on the risk-hedging motives implied by a dynamic model, which emphasizes the importance of risk related to long horizons. Second, most of the existing literature adopts the expected-utility paradigm. However, it is well known that expected-utility preferences have counterfactual implications along several asset-price dimensions. Under complete markets, these preferences imply perfect correlation between the cross-country consumption growth and real exchange rate depreciations. In the data, instead, this correlation is extremely weak, as emphasized by Backus and Smith (1993) . Moreover, these preferences are also unable to match other asset-price moments as the high and volatile returns on equities and the shape and volatility of the yield curve. Models that aim at explaining portfolio choices cannot fail in accounting for movements in asset prices, since both are the faces of the same coin. Our framework, instead, modifies the structure of preferences in a way that is desirable for at least two reasons. On the one hand, ambiguity aversion implies a risk-sensitive adjustment that has been shown to be successful in matching some properties of financial data, like the equity premium puzzle (Barillas et al., 2006) and the slope of the yield curve (Piazzesi and Schneider, 2006) . On the other hand, model uncertainty acts like a preference shock in standard preferences and generates a multiplicative perturbation to the stochastic discount factor, relaxing the link between cross-country consumption and the real exchange rate, even with complete markets. 3 Third, we depart from the complete-markets assumption, which is also very common in the current literature. This is a convenient device to obtain a closed-form solution, but it is unrealistic to describe the current stage of financial integration, as argued among others by Obstfeld (2006) .
